- Identify the digital threats specific to humanitarian organisations: phishing, payment fraud, surveillance, data leaks.
- Put in place proportionate basic measures: authentication, backups, encryption, access management, devices.
- Protect the data of the people assisted and of staff, and respond to a digital incident.
Keep the course at home: free PDF handout with exercises, key takeaways and quiz answers.
1Why digital is a security risk
Humanitarian organisations hold highly sensitive information: beneficiary lists (sometimes with biometrics and location), testimonies of violations, medical data, staff information, security analyses, movements. A leak or a hack can put lives in danger, not just data.
Several well-known cyberattacks have targeted humanitarian organisations, including the theft of data on hundreds of thousands of vulnerable people. Organisations are also targeted by online financial fraud and by surveillance of communications by state or non-state actors.
Main threats:
- Phishing: fake emails or messages that steal credentials or install malware.
- Payment fraud: a fake supplier, a fake director requesting an urgent payment, a fraudulent change of bank details.
- Ransomware: data encrypted in exchange for a ransom.
- Theft or seizure of devices (laptops, phones) at checkpoints or during robberies.
- Surveillance of communications and social media.
- Internal errors: sharing by mistake, a file sent to the wrong recipient, a password left on display.
2Basic measures
A few simple measures block the vast majority of common attacks:
- Multi-factor authentication (MFA) on email, online storage, banking and accounting software.
- A password manager and long, unique passwords.
- Automatic updates of systems and applications.
- Regular backups, including one offline or isolated copy, and restore tests (3-2-1 rule: three copies, two different media, one copy off-site).
- Encryption of laptop and phone storage.
- Access management: everyone accesses only what they need; access removed on the day a staff member leaves.
- Regular training, with simulated phishing exercises.
Example of an exercise. A fake phishing email is sent to 120 staff: 38 click on the link (31.7%), 14 enter their credentials (11.7%), 9 report the email to the IT department (7.5%). After targeted training, a second exercise gives 12 clicks (10%), 3 credential entries (2.5%) and 41 reports (34.2%). The rise in reports is as important as the fall in clicks: it turns staff into an early warning system.
3Payment fraud and financial procedures
CEO fraud and bank-detail fraud cost organisations, including humanitarian ones, considerable sums every year. Financial procedures are the best defence:
- Any change of bank details of a supplier or staff member is verified by calling a number already known, never the one given in the request.
- No urgent payment outside procedure, even at the apparent request of a director: dual approval remains mandatory.
- Online banking access uses dedicated devices and accounts, with dual electronic signature.
- Staff know they will be backed if they refuse a suspicious payment, even one requested by a superior.
Urgency and confidentiality are fraudsters' two favourite levers: "I'm in a meeting, make this transfer right away and don't tell anyone."
4Devices, checkpoints and surveillance
In the field, digital risks are also physical:
- At checkpoints, phones may be searched. A phone containing photos of military positions, messages critical of a party or beneficiary lists can lead to detention. Rule: carry only what is necessary, delete sensitive data from field devices, use dedicated work devices.
- Staff social media reveal exploitable information: real-time location, political opinions, photos of colleagues, signs of wealth. A social media policy that is explained and not punitive reduces these risks.
- End-to-end encrypted messaging apps protect content, but not the fact that people are communicating, nor the phone itself if it is seized unlocked.
- The use of certain tools (satellite equipment, VPNs, drones) may be prohibited or viewed with suspicion: check the legislation and acceptance.
5Protecting people's data
The data protection of beneficiaries and staff rests on recognised principles (notably the ICRC and Brussels Privacy Hub Handbook on Data Protection in Humanitarian Action):
- Lawfulness and purpose: a legitimate basis and a specific purpose for each collection.
- Minimisation: collect only what is necessary.
- Informed consent where it is the chosen basis, taking power relations into account (a household that needs aid is not free to refuse).
- Security: encryption, limited access, logging.
- Limited retention and deletion once the purpose has been fulfilled.
- Controlled sharing governed by data-sharing agreements, with a risk analysis (including requests from authorities or parties to the conflict).
- Impact assessment before any new system (biometrics, mobile payments, shared platform).
Example of minimisation. For a kit distribution, you need to identify the household and check that it has not already received the kit. Ethnic or religious affiliation is not necessary and must not be collected; a photo and fingerprint are generally not necessary either.
6Responding to a digital incident
A digital incident (hacked account, stolen computer, ransomware, file sent by mistake) is handled like a security incident:
- Contain: change passwords, revoke sessions, isolate the infected device, remotely wipe a stolen device.
- Assess: what data, which people, what risk to them?
- Inform: senior management, the data protection officer, the people concerned if they are exposed to a risk, supervisory authorities according to the applicable law, donors according to the contracts.
- Restore from backups; do not pay a ransom without a decision by senior management and a legal analysis.
- Learn: analysis, corrections, training.
Example. An unencrypted laptop containing the list of 3,200 households with their phone numbers and locations is stolen during a robbery. The risk to the people depends on the context: if some households belong to a targeted group, it is high. Actions: immediate assessment, informing the communities concerned through safe channels if they are exposed, changing the means of contact, mandatory encryption of all laptops.
Exercise: an urgent email from the director
Situation. On a Friday at 17:00, the accountant receives an email apparently from the country director, who is travelling: "Confidential. We must pay the USD 48,000 deposit to the new fuel supplier today, otherwise we lose the contract. Bank details attached. I can't be reached, meeting with the minister." The sender's address differs by one letter from the usual address. On the same day, a regular supplier asked by email to change its bank details. The organisation's email system has no two-factor authentication.
Task. 1) Warning signs. 2) Immediate course of action. 3) Lasting measures.
Answer. 1) Urgency, confidentiality, the requester being unreachable, a new supplier with no procurement file, a slightly different sender address, a parallel request to change bank details. 2) Do not pay; call the director on their known number (or their deputy); do not change the regular supplier's details without a verification call to a number already known; report to the IT manager and to finance; keep the emails as evidence. 3) Two-factor authentication across the whole email system; a written rule: no payment outside procedure, dual approval, telephone verification of any change of bank details; training and phishing exercises; filtering of look-alike domains; a clear message from senior management: refusing a suspicious payment will always be backed.
Key points
- Humanitarian data are sensitive: a leak can put lives in danger.
- MFA, unique passwords, updates, 3-2-1 backups, encryption, minimal access, training.
- Payment fraud: verification through a known number, dual approval, backing for whoever refuses.
- Field: stripped-down devices at checkpoints, a social media policy.
- Data protection: purpose, minimisation, security, limited retention, impact assessment.
💼 Safety, security and access jobs
Put this course into practice: the latest jobs in this field.
- Programme Analyst, Family Planning & Reproductive Health Commodity Security - NOB, Banjul, The GambiaUNFPA · Gambia
- National Expert on Asbestos Safety Materials and TrainingUNDP · Ukraine
- Director, Monitoring, Learning, and Evaluation, AI Access InitiativeEvidence Action · United States
- Security GuardCURE International · Kenya
- Security Risk Management Mobile Implementation ReferentMédecins Sans Frontières Belgique (MSF OCB) · Belgium
Further reading: course references
- Humanitarian Practice Network (ODI) (2010). Operational Security Management in Violent Environments (Good Practice Review 8, revised edition). odihpn.org
- European Interagency Security Forum (EISF, now GISF) (2017). Security Risk Management: a basic guide for smaller NGOs. gisf.ngo
- EISF (now GISF) (2018). Managing the Security of Aid Workers with Diverse Profiles. gisf.ngo
- EISF (now GISF) (2016). Duty of Care: A review of the Dennis v Norwegian Refugee Council ruling and its implications. gisf.ngo
- RedR UK, Insecurity Insight and EISF (2017). Security Incident Information Management Handbook. gisf.ngo
- Humanitarian Outcomes (2024). Aid Worker Security Report and Aid Worker Security Database. www.aidworkersecurity.org
- United Nations (security management system) and partner NGOs (2015). Saving Lives Together: a framework for improving security arrangements among IGOs, NGOs and the UN. www.un.org
- United Nations (2016). Programme Criticality Framework. www.un.org
- Centre of Competence on Humanitarian Negotiation (CCHN) (2019). Field Manual on Frontline Humanitarian Negotiation. frontline-negotiations.org
- Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) (2019). Six Core Principles relating to Sexual Exploitation and Abuse. interagencystandingcommittee.org
- Grand Bargain Risk Sharing Platform (InterAction, the Netherlands and partners) (2023). Risk Sharing Framework. www.interaction.org
- ICRC and Brussels Privacy Hub (2020). Handbook on Data Protection in Humanitarian Action (2nd edition). www.icrc.org
- Antares Foundation (2012). Managing Stress in Humanitarian Workers: Guidelines for Good Practice. www.antaresfoundation.org
- International Organization for Standardization (ISO) (2018). ISO 31000:2018 Risk management – Guidelines. www.iso.org
Weekly quiz
5 demanding questions to check your learning. Answer them all to complete the week.