Minimum expenditure basket, transfer value and market monitoring

Month 0: millet 75 × 300 = 22,500; cowpeas 12 × 550 = 6,600; oil 5 × 1,200 = 6,000; food subtotal 35,100. Non-food: 2,000 + 1,500 (6 × 250) + 9,000 + 10,000 + 5,000 = 27,500. MEB = 62,600 FCFA.

Month 3: millet 75 × 390 = 29,250; cowpeas 12 × 600 = 7,200; oil 5 × 1,300 = 6,500; food subtotal 42,950. Non-food: 2,000 + 1,800 + 9,000 + 10,000 + 5,000 = 27,800. MEB = 70,750 FCFA.

Change: (70,750 − 62,600) / 62,600 = 8,150 / 62,600 = +13.0%. The food component alone rises by 22.4% (42,950 / 35,100). The 10% threshold is exceeded: the rule is triggered.

New value: 70% × 70,750 = 49,525, rounded to 49,500 FCFA (instead of 44,000, i.e. +5,500). At 44,000 FCFA, the assistance now covers only 62.2% of the MEB.

Cost: 2,400 × 49,500 × 3 = 356,400,000 FCFA. Budget: 330,000,000. Shortfall: 26,400,000 FCFA (8.0% of the remaining budget).

Option A: keep 2,400 households and pay the maximum possible: 330,000,000 / (2,400 × 3) = 45,833, i.e. 45,500 FCFA after rounding down; coverage of 64.3% of the MEB, below the CWG rule. Option B: keep 49,500 FCFA and reduce to 330,000,000 / 148,500 = 2,222 households, i.e. 178 households dropped mid-project, which raises an accountability and protection problem. Option C: ask the donor for a budget revision or activation of a crisis modifier of 26.4 million, based on the CWG rule and the price data.

Recommendation: option C, submitted immediately with the evidence; pending the reply, apply option A for payment 4 rather than dropping households. Inform the CWG to keep values harmonised across partners and inform households of any change.

Kaya and Pissila: steady increase (+16% and +27% between months 1 and 3), but stocks of 30 and 14 days and open roads: the market is functioning, and the increase can be absorbed by adjusting the value. Cash remains appropriate; monitor Pissila stocks closely.

Barsalogho: 48% increase in two months (290 to 430), 5 days of stock, road cut, 41% of households without millet. The problem is not only price but availability: raising the value alone would fuel local inflation. The local MEB, with millet at 430, is 73,750 FCFA (+17.8% compared with the baseline).

Adjustments: (1) move Barsalogho to a mixed modality: commodity or value vouchers with contracted traders who commit to supply, or in-kind distribution for the cereal and cash for the rest; (2) support supply (grouped transport for traders with the convoys, cash advances under contract); (3) payment schedule aligned with convoy arrivals. Thresholds: stock below 7 days or millet price more than 25% above baseline for 2 weeks: switch to vouchers or in-kind; return to cash when stock exceeds 14 days. Weekly monitoring of prices and stocks in Barsalogho.

Cash-out points: 47% of female heads of household are more than 2 hours away: add mobile agents or decentralised payment days.

Example: "Subject: revision request, Centre-Nord cash transfer project. Dear Sir or Madam, our price monitoring shows that the cost of the minimum expenditure basket rose from 62,600 to 70,750 FCFA between month 0 and month 3 (+13.0%), beyond the 10% revision threshold set by the regional working group. The current value of 44,000 FCFA now covers only 62% of the basket. We request an increase to 49,500 FCFA for the last three payments, i.e. an additional requirement of 26.4 million FCFA. In Barsalogho, stocks cover only 5 days and 41% of households could not find millet: we propose replacing the cereal share with vouchers redeemable with contracted traders, linked to the convoys. Pending your approval, we will pay 45,500 FCFA to all households so as not to reduce the number of beneficiaries. Detailed data are attached. Kind regards."

I refuse to keep the information quiet: this is fraud that reduces the assistance by 1 to 2.3% and affects 9% of surveyed households, i.e. about 220 households if extrapolated to 2,400; it is also a protection risk (pressure from agents). Actions: (1) report the case to the mobile money provider, with a contractual reminder that withdrawals are free and a request for investigation; (2) inform country management and the compliance function in line with the anti-fraud policy, and the donor within the contractual deadlines; (3) messages to households on free withdrawal and on the complaints mechanism, with a toll-free number; (4) follow-up through verification calls at the next payment and reimbursement of amounts wrongly taken if the contract allows. Transparency protects the organisation's credibility.