Week 6 of 12 · 12 hours · Month 2

Armed escorts: the rule, the exceptions and the decision

Objectives of the week
  • State the general rule of the IASC guidelines: humanitarian convoys do not use armed escorts.
  • Analyse a request for an exception with a structured grid: critical need, alternatives, real security, perception, duration.
  • Organise an escort accepted as an exception and prepare its end.

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Your working week : 12 h

The course alone is not enough: this plan spreads the 12 hours of the week. Tick each step once done.

1The general rule

The IASC non-binding guidelines on the use of armed escorts for humanitarian convoys (2013, replacing the 2001 paper) set a clear rule: as a general rule, humanitarian convoys do not use armed escorts.

Why? An armed escort:

  • visibly associates aid with an armed actor, which compromises perceived neutrality;
  • may attract attacks rather than deter them;
  • creates a dependence that is hard to end;
  • may weaken the acceptance patiently built by all organisations, including those that do not use escorts.

Exceptions exist, but they are exceptional: a last resort to meet a critical need, when no other measure can bring the risk to an acceptable level.

2A grid for deciding on an exception

To decide, the Academy suggests answering the following questions in writing, in order (they follow the spirit of the guidelines; read the full text in this week's readings):

  1. Need: is the activity critical? How many people, what risk if it does not take place?
  2. Alternatives: access negotiation, change of route or timing, low profile, accepted local partners, civilian air transport… have they been tried or analysed?
  3. Real security: does the escort really reduce the risk, or does it increase it (attracted target, exchange of fire)?
  4. Provider: who would escort? A party to the conflict raises more problems than a host-State police force or a peace force that is not a party.
  5. Perception and effects: what effect on the acceptance of the organisation and of the whole humanitarian community?
  6. Duration and exit: for how long, and under what condition does the escort stop?

3Who decides

Each organisation remains responsible for its security decisions. In the United Nations, the use of armed escorts falls within the security risk management system and involves the country's humanitarian leadership. The guidelines recommend that exception decisions be taken at the highest level in the country, documented, and as far as possible discussed collectively (humanitarian country team, NGO forums), because one organisation's escort affects all the others.

Many NGOs have an internal policy that excludes any armed escort, unless decided by the head office. Others, like the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, keep to a very strict policy based on acceptance.

4Organising an accepted escort

If an escort is accepted as an exception, rules limit its effects:

  • Written agreement with the provider: strictly defensive role, known rules of engagement, clear chain of command, no transport of weapons or soldiers in humanitarian vehicles.
  • Distance between escort vehicles and humanitarian vehicles, to keep the distinction visible.
  • No payment that would turn aid into a source of funding for an armed party; if costs are unavoidable (for example fuel or allowances for a host-State police force), they are transparent and approved.
  • Regular review (for example monthly) against the criteria, with a plan to return to convoys without escort.

5A numerical example

On a road to a camp of 40,000 people, 6 convoys out of 50 were attacked in three months (12%). The attacks are by bandits, not by a party to the conflict. The host-State police offer an escort. After negotiation with community leaders and a change of timing, the rate falls to 2 attacks out of 45 convoys (4.4%) the following quarter, without escort.

Lesson: the grid requires testing alternatives first. Here, they reduced the risk by almost two thirds; the escort was no longer a last resort.

Exercise: applying the grid

A non-State armed group controls the road to an area where a cholera outbreak is spreading (12,000 people exposed). The national army, a party to the conflict, offers to escort your trucks. The armed group has declared that it will attack "any military convoy". No dialogue has yet been attempted with it.

Apply the grid and give your recommendation.

Model answer. Need: critical. Alternatives: not tried (dialogue with the armed group, delivery through an accepted organisation, air transport). Real security: the army escort would increase the risk, as the group has announced it would attack military convoys. Provider: party to the conflict, very negative perception. Recommendation: refuse the escort, urgently open a dialogue on access and study a civilian airlift.

Required reading

Official, free documents. Answer the questions in writing: they prepare the deliverable and the exam.

  1. IASC Non-Binding Guidelines on the Use of Armed Escorts for Humanitarian Convoys (2013)
    Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) · Open the document

    • What is the general rule set by the guidelines?
    • Which criteria do the guidelines give for an exception?
    • Who must decide, and how must the decision be reviewed?
  2. Security risk management: guides for NGOs
    GISF · Open the document

    • How do the guides place escorts within acceptance, protection and deterrence strategies?
    • Which alternatives do they propose?
    • Which indirect effects on acceptance do they describe?
  3. UN-CMCoord Field Handbook (version 2.0)
    OCHA · Open the document

    • What does the handbook say about armed escorts?
    • What role does OCHA play in these decisions?
    • Which practical examples does it give?

Deliverable of the week : Analysis of a request for an armed escort

Based on a realistic case, apply the six-question grid, quantify the risk with and without an escort, compare at least three alternatives and make a reasoned recommendation in 3 to 4 pages.

Marking grid (out of 20)

Need established3 pts
Alternatives analysed5 pts
Quantified risk and real security4 pts
Perception and collective effects4 pts
Recommendation and conditions (duration, review)4 pts
See the model answer (after writing your deliverable)

What work scoring 16/20 or more looks like.

Order. Alternatives are analysed before any escort, with their quantified effect.

Recommendation. If an escort is chosen: provider, written agreement, distance, no funding of a party, limited duration and review.

Mistakes that cost points. Treating the escort as the default solution; ignoring the effect on other organisations.

Key points

  • General rule: no armed escort for humanitarian convoys.
  • Exception only as a last resort for a critical need, when no other measure is enough.
  • Grid: need, alternatives, real security, provider, perception, duration and exit.
  • Decision at the highest level, documented and discussed collectively.
  • Accepted escort: written agreement, distance, no funding of an armed party, regular review.
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Further reading: course references
  1. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) (2018). UN-CMCoord Field Handbook (version 2.0). reliefweb.int/report/world/un-cmcoord-field-handbook-version-20-2018-enarfres
  2. OCHA (2007). Oslo Guidelines: Guidelines on the Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief (Rev. 1.1). digitallibrary.un.org/record/770364
  3. OCHA (2006). Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies (MCDA Guidelines, Rev. 1). reliefweb.int/report/world/guidelines-use-military-and-civil-defence-assets-support-united-nations-humanitarian
  4. Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) (2004). Civil-Military Relationship in Complex Emergencies: an IASC Reference Paper. digitallibrary.un.org/record/697614
  5. Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) (2013). IASC Non-Binding Guidelines on the Use of Armed Escorts for Humanitarian Convoys. webarchive.archive.unhcr.org/20151218190533if_/http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/523189ab4.pdf
  6. Centre of Competence on Humanitarian Negotiation (CCHN) (2019). Field Manual on Frontline Humanitarian Negotiation. frontline-negotiations.org
  7. ICRC and Brussels Privacy Hub (2020). Handbook on Data Protection in Humanitarian Action (2nd edition). www.icrc.org/en/data-protection-humanitarian-action-handbook
  8. United Nations Secretary-General (2003). Special measures for protection from sexual exploitation and sexual abuse (ST/SGB/2003/13). digitallibrary.un.org/record/504355/files/ST_SGB_2003_13-EN.pdf

Weekly quiz

5 demanding questions to check your learning. Answer them all to complete the week.

1According to the IASC guidelines, as a general rule, humanitarian convoys:
2Which step comes first when analysing an exception?
3An escort provided by a party to the conflict:
4Why discuss an escort decision collectively?
5In the numerical example, the attack rate falls from 12% to about:

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