Analysis of an access constraints log and humanitarian notification letter

By category: 3 (movement): nos. 1, 7, 11, 15, 19 = 5; 4 (interference): nos. 2, 6, 13 = 3; 5 (violence): nos. 4, 12, 17 = 3; 7 (hostilities): nos. 5, 14 = 2; 8 (explosive devices): nos. 8, 16 = 2; 9 (physical): nos. 3, 10 = 2; 6 (population access): no. 9 = 1; 2 (entry into the country): no. 18 = 1. Total 19. Another justified classification is accepted for no. 13 (category 3 or 4).

By actor: armed group A 5 (nos. 2, 7, 9, 13, 15) plus 1 shared (no. 5); DSF 4 (nos. 1, 11, 14, 19) plus 1 shared; unknown 3; none 2; armed group B 1; local authority 1; community 1; administration 1.

By month: August 6, September 7, October 6.

The Bocaranga-Koui road accounts for 7 incidents out of 19 (37%), and 10 including the town of Koui. The five taxation checkpoints there alternate between the DSF (3) and armed group A (2): the problem is structural, not occasional. The interference by armed group A in Koui (beneficiary list, paid registration) aims at controlling aid. The explosive devices towards Ngaoundaye (2 incidents in just over 5 weeks, including one vehicle hit) require movements on the tracks concerned to be suspended until an assessment is carried out. The threats against national staff (no. 17) call for a review of targeting and community communication.

Consequences: common NGO position refusing any payment (through the NGO forum); advocacy with the DSF command on the checkpoints; dialogue with armed group A on the independence of aid, with no registration or sharing of lists; sharing of the log with OCHA and INSO.

Expected elements: NGO letterhead, date and reference; subject "Notification of humanitarian movement"; brief reminder of the mandate and principles (humanity, neutrality, impartiality, independence); details: dates, approximate departure and return times, route and stopping points, number and identification of vehicles (make, colour, registration, emblem, no weapons on board), number of people on board (without names), nature of the activity and goods; request to inform the units and checkpoints along the road; reminder that aid is provided without payment; contact reachable 24 hours a day; copy to OCHA and the administrative authority. The letter notifies a movement: it does not request authorisation and does not ask for an escort or protection. Courteous and factual tone, with no reference to incidents attributed to other actors.

Recommend declining for now. Armed escorts are a last resort, according to the IASC non-binding guidelines: they can only be considered if the threat is serious, the needs are life-saving and no other option exists. Here, the main constraints are taxation and interference, not targeted attacks on convoys; a DSF escort would associate the NGO with a party to the conflict, expose convoys to attacks by armed group A and undermine acceptance in Koui. Alternatives: systematic notification, dialogue with all actors, movements adapted after the operations, information sharing with OCHA and INSO, common NGO position. Any contrary decision lies with the country management after analysis and inter-agency consultation.