Analysis of access incidents, actor mapping and negotiation strategy

Change: 24 incidents from April to June, 50 from July to September (+ 108%). Interference rises from 7 to 23 (multiplied by 3.3); its share rises from 29% to 46%. Movement restrictions rise from 13 to 18.

Shares over the period: restrictions 31 of 74 (42%), interference 30 (41%), violence 8 (11%), explosive devices 5 (7%). NSAG-A: 41 (55%), authorities: 23 (31%), others: 10 (14%).

Trend: the problem is shifting from movement to control of aid: NSAG-A is seeking to govern assistance (lists, taxes, targeting). The negotiation must therefore address programme modalities, not only passage.

Limitations: the number of NGOs reporting rose from 6 to 9 in July, which partly inflates the increase; probable under-reporting of payments and interference; attribution of perpetrators often presumed; incident counts without a denominator (number of missions).

NSAG-A iceberg: positions: the four conditions. Reasoning: control who receives aid, fund its fighters, avoid a military presence. Motives: legitimacy with the population, security, resources.

Our iceberg: position: assist the 42,000 people according to need. Reasoning: impartial targeting, no diversion. Motives: humanitarian principles, staff safety, accountability to donors and communities.

Island of agreement: "everyone is served" aligns with impartiality; refusal of military escorts is compatible with our policy; shared interest in convoy safety. Divergent norms: levy, tax, control of targeting.

Red lines (set by management, not negotiable by the team): no payment, no diversion, no handover of named lists, control of targeting by the organisation.

Network of influence: religious and traditional leaders, traders: have them carry the value of impartial aid.

(1) 10% of the food: refused. Argument: aid is reserved for civilians in need; any diversion would stop the funding and therefore the aid for the whole area. Proposal: vulnerability criteria that include families from all villages, including fighters' families if they meet the criteria.

(2) Choice of beneficiaries: control refused, openness to participation. Proposal: targeting committees elected by the community, with women and herders, public criteria posted, complaints mechanism, verification by our team; the commander is informed of the criteria, not the lists.

(3) No escort: agreed, in line with our policy. But our movements are notified to both parties (not subject to authorisation); the authorities' escort requirement on two roads must also be addressed through a separate dialogue, in the name of the same principle.

(4) Tax: refused. Argument: a payment sets a precedent, exposes us legally and endangers other organisations. Proposal: reduce the burden on the community (local markets, purchases from traders), with nothing given in return to the group.

Conclude with a limited and verifiable first step (a pilot distribution in two villages) to build trust.

Example: "The members of the Tillabéri access working group adopt the following common operating principles: (1) no payment, in cash or in kind, to a party to the conflict to reach populations; (2) targeting remains the responsibility of organisations, with community committees and public criteria; (3) no named list is handed to any party; (4) movements are notified, not subject to authorisation; (5) any demand for payment or interference is reported to the group within 48 hours, in anonymised form; (6) an organisation that receives a non-compliant demand suspends the activity concerned and informs the group. A common position will be presented to interlocutors by a delegation."

Approach with the two NGOs: confidential bilateral dialogue, without public accusation, showing that each payment weakens everyone.

I understand the urgency, but I do not recommend accepting. The 5% does not stay symbolic: the precedent spreads to other areas, other organisations and future distributions; it is material support to a party, contrary to neutrality, to donor contracts and potentially to the law; if discovered, funding and access are lost for everyone.

I propose: the pilot distribution in two villages, the support of religious leaders, the working group's common position, and a needs analysis for less exposed modalities (local purchases, cash transfers if markets are functioning). If the director maintains his position, the decision rests with regional management and the legal department: I ask for it to be taken and put in writing at that level.