Movement tracking, missed check-in and managing the first hours of an incident

First missed check-in (09:30): contact attempt expected at 09:45, security officer informed at 10:00. Nothing was done: the late check-in at 09:55 "made up" for the delay, but the lack of reaction at 09:30 is already a failure, and the 09:55 check-in should have been logged as late with a new check-in time agreed.

Second missed check-in (10:30): all means to be tried at 10:45 (only VHF was tried; satellite phone only at 11:10, passengers' phones never); security officer to be informed at 11:00, done at 11:40, i.e. 40 minutes late; activation of the incident management team expected at 11:30, not done by 11:40. The log does not mention a satellite phone call to vehicle Alpha 2, nor a passenger list.

Probable position: departure from km 41 at about 10:00 (after the 09:55 check-in). At 30 km/h, the convoy reaches km 50 in 18 minutes, i.e. at about 10:18, and would have reached site S-12 (27 km) at about 10:54. At 10:30, without stopping, it would be around km 56. However, a roadblock has been reported at km 50 since about 10:00: the convoy was very probably stopped there at about 10:18, which explains the silence at 10:30.

Other findings: the log does not mention any information on road conditions before departure; loss of VHF contact beyond 40 km was foreseeable and should have led to check-ins by satellite phone.

1. Immediately retry every means of contact: satellite phones of both vehicles, phones of the six passengers, HF if available; record each attempt with the time.
2. Inform the head of office (activation of the incident management team, already late under the procedure) and the senior security adviser.
3. Gather information: list of passengers' names, emergency contacts, vehicle plates and colours, last known point (km 41 at 09:55), estimated position (km 50 at about 10:18); check GPS tracking data if the vehicles are equipped.
4. Call reliable sources: other organisations operating on the road, the civil-military coordination mechanism, community leaders at site S-12 (has the convoy arrived?), without sharing names or personal details.
5. Suspend all other movements on the northern road.
6. Do not send a vehicle to search for the convoy without a decision by the incident management team: risk of creating new victims.
7. Prepare the next decisions: thresholds for informing families, search plan, contact with the authorities, controlled internal communication (no messages on social media).
8. Keep an incident log from this moment.

"Continue" option: km 50 to S-12: 18 km at 30 km/h = 36 minutes, arrival 13:21; 2-hour distribution, departure 15:21; return from S-12 to base: 68 km = 2 h 16 min, plus 30 minutes at the riverbed and 20 minutes at the checkpoint, i.e. 3 h 06 min: arrival at about 18:27, after the 17:00 limit, with another passage through the km 50 roadblock.

"Immediate return" option: 50 km = 1 h 40 min, plus 30 minutes at the riverbed and 20 minutes at the checkpoint, i.e. 2 h 30 min: arrival at about 15:15, before 17:00.

Decision: immediate return. The convoy has just suffered a serious incident (detention, violence, extortion), the team is in shock, the roadblock is still active and the "continue" option breaches the 17:00 rule. The community at site S-12 is informed through community leaders that the distribution is postponed. Check-ins every 30 minutes until arrival; team met on arrival at base.

Example: "Subject: flash report, detention of a convoy, northern road, km 50. What: two of the organisation's vehicles (Alpha 1 and Alpha 2, 6 people) were stopped at a roadblock manned by unidentified armed young men. When: from about 10:20 to 12:40. Where: km 50 on the Malakal - site S-12 road. Consequences: phones confiscated and then returned; one driver slapped, with no visible injury; SSP 50,000 from the mission advance handed over to obtain release. All staff are free and returning to base, expected arrival at about 15:15. Measures taken: distribution at site S-12 postponed, movements suspended on the northern road, other organisations informed of the roadblock. Shortcomings: the loss of contact was reported 40 minutes late. Next steps: reception and support for the team, medical examination of the driver, debriefing, full report within 48 hours, analysis of access to this road before any resumption."

• Staff: met on arrival, medical examination of the driver, psychological first aid offered to all, access to confidential psychosocial support, days of rest available; families informed if necessary; operational debriefing kept separate from psychological support.
• Money handed over: the team leader acted for the safety of the group, which must not be sanctioned; the payment is declared, documented and reported to finance and management as a payment under duress. Restate the policy: no passage "tax" is paid, but staff lives come before property.
• Access: suspend movements on the road; identify the perpetrators and their motives through community leaders and other organisations; share information on the incident with other humanitarian actors; open an access negotiation to restate the humanitarian and neutral nature of the aid; resume only after a new risk analysis.
• Procedure: training for the radio room on the thresholds; quick-reference card posted with the alert times; check-ins by satellite phone beyond VHF range; list of passengers and phone numbers attached to every movement order; GPS tracking of vehicles; information on road conditions before each departure.