Crisis management: abduction of a national staff member

Failures: movement without authorisation or tracking, alone, at a peak time for abductions and towards a flagged area; GPS stop at 08:05 not monitored in real time; 70 minutes between the stop and the first alert, then another 2 h 25 before you were informed: no alert procedure for a missed check-in; information leak in a group of 140 people with a photo (risk of public dissemination, a higher ransom, new targets); unprepared contact with the wife by a person who had not been designated; ransom demand received by the family before the organisation reacted; call from a journalist with no instructions at reception; dangerous proposal to recover the vehicle (trap, evidence for the investigation).

Actions between 12:30 and 14:30: (1) forbid recovery of the vehicle: it is left to the police; (2) inform the country director and headquarters, by 12:40 at the latest, in line with the policy (notification within the hour); the designated deputy leads the cell if the country director is absent; (3) have the message and photo removed from the WhatsApp group and send a confidentiality instruction; (4) instruction to reception: "We have no comment; your contact details will be passed on"; (5) designate a family liaison officer, trained if possible, and ask them to contact the wife today to support her, ask her not to make any commitment and to note every call (time, number, content); (6) suspend all non-essential movements and check that every employee is in a safe place (roll call); (7) convene the country crisis cell; (8) set up a time-stamped crisis log.

Composition (small, 5 to 7 people): head of the cell (country director or designated deputy): decisions, link with the headquarters cell; security coordinator: analysis, measures for the rest of the staff, liaison with the security network and the police; family liaison officer: sole contact with the family; HR manager: contractual situation, salary, insurance, psychosocial support for staff; crisis secretary: time-stamped log, decisions, actions; as needed: communications manager (in liaison with headquarters), legal adviser. The specialist advice provided under the insurance is activated by headquarters.

24-hour plan: (1) establish the facts (last GPS position, witnesses, the colleague who was waiting for Jean) without investigating yourself; (2) contacts with the kidnappers: they call the family; with the family's agreement and the support of the specialist adviser, prepare the wife or designate a trained communicator; rules: never promise or refuse bluntly, ask for proof of life (a question only Jean can answer), record or note every exchange, never mention the organisation, its insurance or amounts; (3) inform the competent authorities (criminal investigation police) in consultation with the family and the specialist adviser; (4) support for the family: visit, practical help, salary maintained, psychological support, protection if they are threatened; (5) staff: factual briefing, reminder of confidentiality, psychosocial support, suspension of movements and immediate review of procedures; (6) communication: holding statement prepared by headquarters; social media monitoring; (7) cell review every 6 to 12 h and report to headquarters; planning for the long haul (median captivity is 9 days: plan the rotation of cell members).

(a) Internal message: "Dear colleagues, a colleague has been missing since this morning. A crisis cell is in place and the whole organisation is mobilised. For his safety, do not publish or forward any information, name or photo on any network, and do not answer any outside questions, including from the media: refer them to the head of base. All movements are suspended until further notice, except with written authorisation. If you receive a call or message about this colleague, note the time and content and inform the security coordinator immediately. Psychological support is available. Thank you for your solidarity and discretion."

(b) Holding statement: "We are aware that a member of our staff is missing in Port-au-Prince. His safety and support for his family are our priority. Out of respect for him and his family, we will make no further comment at this time."

Neither text gives the name, the amount demanded, the insurance, or publicly confirms the word "abduction".

Calculations: total over 6 months = 18 + 22 + 27 + 31 + 26 + 34 = 158, i.e. an average of 26.3 per month; October against May: 34 / 18 = 1.89, i.e. + 89%. A clearly rising trend despite the dip in September. Aid-related victims (national and international NGO and UN staff): 11 + 3 = 14, i.e. 8.9%; including health workers: 28, i.e. 17.7%. National staff are affected 3.7 times more than international staff (11 against 3). Fake checkpoints and interceptions in traffic: 58 + 47 = 105, i.e. 66.5%: the main risk is travel by vehicle. Home: 29, i.e. 18.4%. 71% at peak times.

Interpretation: aid workers are not the main target (the motive is mainly financial), but they are exposed like anyone perceived as able to pay, and national staff more so.

Adaptations: mandatory movement request for every trip, including "routine" ones; real-time GPS tracking with an automatic alert for any unplanned stop of more than 10 minutes; check-in call on departure, on arrival and every 30 minutes; written procedure for missed check-ins (alert to the coordinator within 15 minutes); avoid the 06:00 to 09:00 and 16:00 to 19:00 slots, staggered working hours; varied routes and times; map of roads and junctions to avoid, updated every week with the security network; two vehicles or two people for sensitive areas; low profile (unmarked vehicles if the analysis justifies it); measures for national staff: safe transport allowance, support for home-to-office journeys, home security advice; training in driving and behaviour in the event of interception; monitoring of indicators (compliance with movement requests, alert times).

Principle: the policy prohibits any ransom payment by the organisation, directly or indirectly. Giving the money to the family or funding the collection would be an indirect payment: it would increase the risk for all staff (the organisation would become a profitable target), could breach the law and donor clauses, and could raise the demands or prolong the captivity. The country director's proposal must be refused and referred to the headquarters crisis cell, which is the decision-making body.

Towards the family: listen with humanity; explain that the organisation does not pay, but that it is mobilising all its resources (specialist adviser, liaison with the authorities, support); respect the fact that the family remains free to make its own decisions, without the organisation funding or organising them; maintain the salary, practical and psychological support.

Towards colleagues: thank them for their solidarity and explain the risk: a known collection signals that staff can raise money quickly. Ask them to stop it, without sanction, and suggest other forms of support. Document all decisions in the crisis log.