Incident analysis, risk assessment and movement decision

Breakdown: 12 incidents, of which 8 on road A (67%) and 4 on road B. On road A: 5 armed robberies or attempts (Nos. 1, 4, 7, 9, 12), i.e. 63% of the incidents on that road; 1 deadly clash; 1 checkpoint; 1 episode of gunfire in town. Road B has no armed robbery and no humanitarian target; one accident there left one person injured.

Area: all 5 armed robberies occurred between km 34 and km 40, a stretch of about 6 km, in the area without network coverage. Time slot: all between 13:30 and 17:00, i.e. the return leg of a mission that left in the morning.

Trend: 1 robbery in July, 2 in August, 2 in September, with increasing violence: simple theft, then a gunshot injury (No. 7), then a driver beaten (No. 12). Humanitarian targeting: 3 of the 5 robberies targeted humanitarians (Nos. 4, 7, 9), including an international NGO vehicle: humanitarian status offers no protection. This morning's information (km 45) indicates an armed group close to the high-risk area, which also increases the risk of clashes.

The deputy greatly underestimates the risk. Armed robbery: 5 robberies in 90 days on the same stretch, 3 against humanitarians: likelihood 4 (likely); one gunshot injury: impact 4 (severe), or even 5; risk 4 × 4 = 16, very high. Clashes: 1 deadly clash, armed group reported at km 45 this morning: likelihood 3, impact 5, risk 15, very high. Accident: 3 hours on dirt roads in rainy weather, 2 vehicles, an accident has already occurred on road B: likelihood 3, impact 4, risk 12, high; road accidents are often the leading cause of death among aid workers, and scoring this risk at 2 is a classic mistake.

After mitigation (crossing the km 34 to 40 area only between 7:00 and 12:00, return the next day or overnight stay in a safe place, satellite phone check-ins every 30 minutes, low profile, no valuables, informing local actors and the NGO security forum, experienced drivers, speed limits): armed robbery 3 × 4 = 12; clashes 2 × 5 = 10 if the km 45 information is disproved, otherwise the risk remains 15; accident 2 × 4 = 8. The highest residual risk remains at the high level and depends on verifying today's information.

Decision for tomorrow: no movement on road A while the risk is very high and the km 45 information has not been verified. The donor is asking for an assessment, not for people to be put in danger; an assessment activity is generally not of a criticality that justifies a very high risk.

Options: (1) Postponement of 48 to 72 hours with verification of the information (partners, security forum, local authorities, leaders in Mbrès); little risk, limited delay. (2) Remote assessment or assessment by a partner based in Mbrès: telephone interviews with key informants, data collection by a trained local team, satellite imagery; fast, but less detailed data and risk transferred to the partner, which must be assessed and supported. (3) Adapted mission if the risk comes down: team reduced to 3 people in 2 vehicles, without the 2 exposed staff members, departure 6:30, crossing the area before noon, overnight stay in Mbrès in an assessed location, return the next morning. (4) Air access if there is a humanitarian flight or an airstrip in Mbrès: higher cost, road risk eliminated.

Recommendation: option 2 immediately to give the donor initial data this week, then option 3 or 4 once the risk has been reassessed. I inform the donor of the timetable and the reasons.

No, not in this case. According to the IASC Non-Binding Guidelines on the Use of Armed Escorts for Humanitarian Convoys, an armed escort is a last resort, when the need is life-saving, no other option exists and the escort genuinely reduces the risk. Here: (1) alternatives exist (postponement, remote assessment, air); (2) an escort may make the convoy a target for the armed group and increase the risk of clashes; (3) it compromises the perception of the organisation's neutrality and independence, with lasting effects on access and on the safety of teams and populations; (4) the population of Mbrès could be exposed to reprisals after an armed force has passed through. In any case, the decision would rest with the country director, in coordination with other humanitarian actors.

This is a question of differentiated risk: the same journey does not represent the same risk for everyone. These two staff members face a higher risk (abduction, targeted violence) and may also expose the rest of the team. Removing them from this mission is not discrimination, provided the decision is based on a risk analysis, is explained and does not penalise their career or pay.

I hold an individual, confidential meeting with each of them: I listen to them (they often know the context better than we do), explain the analysis, and point out that consenting to risk is not enough: the organisation retains its duty of care. I offer them a useful role in the remote assessment (telephone interviews, analysis). The same analysis applies to other profiles (nationality, gender, function). I document the decision and incorporate differentiated risk into the security plan for the area.