Humanitarian written tests and interviews: worked examples

Strong answer

During a post-distribution monitoring survey, every evening I entered and checked the questionnaires from six enumerators. On the third day, I sorted the interviews by duration: 11 questionnaires from the same enumerator lasted less than 8 minutes, against 35 on average, with almost identical answers. I did not delete anything. I recorded the cases in the cleaning log and alerted the MEAL officer that same evening, with the table. He had 5 households called back: 3 had never been interviewed. The 11 questionnaires were redone by another team, before the analysis. I then proposed an automatic daily report in KoboToolbox of durations and out-of-range values by enumerator. On the next survey, 420 questionnaires, we spotted and corrected 9 anomalies on the first day, instead of discovering them at the analysis stage.

Strong answer

In Niger, I was supervising a post-distribution monitoring survey of 420 households with eight enumerators. My daily control table showed that one enumerator had a median duration of 11 minutes for a 28-minute questionnaire, and no "don't know" answers. I had 12 of her households called back: 7 did not remember any visit. I presented these facts to the enumerator in private, with the supervisor; she admitted to filling in questionnaires from the list, under pressure from a target of 15 interviews a day. We discarded her 64 interviews and had her households re-interviewed in three days. The report went out four days late, which I announced to the project manager on the first day. Afterwards, I reduced the target to 8 interviews a day, increased back-checks to 10% and added automatic alerts on duration.

Strong answer

In a water project in North Kivu, our monthly monitoring showed that 30% of the 48 rehabilitated water points had broken down by the third month, against 5% planned. I first checked the data through cross-verification visits to 12 points. Then I analysed the maintenance records with the engineer and facilitated four focus group discussions with the management committees: spare parts were not available on the local market and the committees were no longer collecting contributions. I presented these findings to the project manager with two costed options, and we then proposed to the donor to reallocate USD 18,000 to a stock of spare parts and the training of six local repair technicians. Six months later, 92% of the points were working. We built a functionality indicator into all subsequent water projects.

Strong answer

I was a storekeeper in a 600 m² warehouse. A truck delivered 3,000 tarpaulins. Before signing, I counted with a colleague: 2 pallets were missing, that is 200 tarpaulins, and 40 were wet. I wrote the reservations on the delivery note, had the driver sign it and took photos. The driver suggested I sign it as "compliant" and promised the rest the next day: I politely refused. I issued the goods received note for the 2,760 tarpaulins accepted and sent a message with the photos to the logistics officer the same day. The supplier delivered the 240 missing and rejected tarpaulins ten days later, and the invoice was paid on the quantities received. I then proposed a simple rule: no delivery note is signed before the count. At the last quarterly stock count, the discrepancy was 0.3%.

Strong answer

In Mali, while preparing a payment to a supplier of hygiene kits, I reconciled the purchase order, the goods received note and the invoice: the invoice was for 2,000 kits, the goods received note for 2,000, but the stock card recorded only 1,860. I did a physical count with the storekeeper and a finance colleague: 1,860 kits. The goods received note had been signed when the truck arrived, before the count. I suspended the payment, notified the supplier within the contractual deadline of five days and asked for the waybill. The supplier acknowledged a loading error and delivered the 140 missing kits, worth USD 3,080. I then had two rules adopted: the goods received note is signed only after a count, by two people, and payment is made only after three-way matching. Over the following twelve months, we had no unresolved discrepancies.

Strong answer

In South Sudan, I managed supply for 14 nutrition centres. In March, the weekly stock report showed that therapeutic food covered only 19 days, while the replenishment lead time from Juba was 45 days because of flooded roads. I recalculated consumption with the nutrition team: admissions had risen by 35% in six weeks. I obtained a loan of 400 cartons from a cluster partner, with a written repayment agreement, and space on a humanitarian flight for 6 tonnes. At the same time, I launched the normal order with the committee, without a waiver. No centre ran out of stock. Afterwards, I set up a reorder point calculated per site, updated every month based on admissions, and prepositioned stocks before the rainy season. Stock-outs went from 6 the previous year to 0.

Strong answer

I was facilitating a community space that received about 40 people a week. A 19-year-old woman told me that a distribution agent was asking her for sex in exchange for her registration. I spoke with her privately, I believed her and told her it was not her fault. I explained that I had to pass the information to the PSEA focal point, that her name would be known only to the people handling the case, and that she could choose the services she wanted. She agreed to be referred to GBV case management. I made the report within 3 hours through the dedicated channel, without writing anything in our general register. A week later, the case manager confirmed to me that she was receiving support. Afterwards, with my supervisor, we trained the 12 volunteers on this procedure.

Strong answer

In the Central African Republic, focus group discussions with women on a site of 9,000 people showed that they avoided the latrines at night, and 11 of the 40 incidents reported in three months had happened on the way to the latrines. I organised a night-time safety walk with the WASH team and four women from the committee. The WASH project manager was worried about exceeding his budget; together we costed 38 solar lamps and locks for 120 latrines, USD 6,200 in total, funded through a reallocation that he presented to the donor. We also moved the location of 20 new latrines, chosen with the women. Three months later, latrine-related incidents had fallen from 11 to 2, and 78% of the women interviewed said they could go there at night. The WASH team built the safety walk into its design procedure.

Strong answer

In Chad, during a follow-up visit, a woman told me that a guard at our warehouse was demanding sex in exchange for registration on the lists. I listened to her without interrupting, and explained what I had to do with the information and what choices she had. She accepted a referral to the partner NGO specialised in GBV the same day. I sent a coded report to the PSEA focal point within 24 hours, without conducting any further interview. The guard was removed as a precautionary measure and the headquarters investigation confirmed two other cases. I then proposed separating registration from the duties of warehouse staff, recruiting two female operators for the complaints hotline and disseminating a clear message that aid is free. Within six months, reports from women rose from 8% to 27% of the feedback received.

Strong answer

As a finance assistant, I prepared the monthly budget monitoring for three grants. While checking the March entries, I saw that a manager's salary budgeted at 30% on one grant had been charged to it at 100% since January. I checked the contract, the timesheet and the approved allocation key: the error amounted to USD 6,300 over three months. I prepared a month-by-month correction table and sent it to the grants officer before the closing. He approved the reallocation to the manager's two other funding sources. I also found an invoice of USD 480 dated before the start of the project: we removed it. I then added an automatic check to the file comparing each charged salary with its allocation key. At the final audit, no staff costs were disallowed.

Strong answer

In Chad, while preparing the six-monthly report for a EUR 450,000 grant, I reviewed the 312 entries for the period using a checklist drawn from the contract. I found three problems: EUR 4,800 of fuel from another project, a motorbike costing EUR 6,200 bought without the prior approval required above EUR 5,000, and EUR 1,150 of tax penalties. The coordinator wanted to report everything. I showed him the clauses and the audit risk, then I reclassified the fuel to the correct project, moved the penalties to own funds and drafted a request for retroactive approval for the motorbike, with the quotations and the justification. The donor accepted it within three weeks. The report went out on time, and the final audit found no ineligible costs. Since then, every purchase above EUR 3,000 goes through me before the purchase order.

Strong answer

In CAR, at month 7 of a USD 600,000 project, my monthly monitoring showed a 38% burn rate instead of the planned 58%: insecurity had blocked two out of five areas for three months. I met each activity manager to distinguish delays that could be caught up from activities that had become impossible. Two weeks later, I sent the donor a note with three options: a four-month no-cost extension, reallocation of USD 85,000 to an accessible area with documented needs, or a budget reduction. The programme officer was worried about drift; I offered a monthly expenditure plan and an additional interim report. He accepted the extension and the reallocation. The project ended with a 97% burn rate and an unqualified audit. Since then, I have held a monthly budget and activity review with each project manager.

Strong answer

As a coordination assistant, I compiled the monthly bulletin of a working group of 11 partners, due on the 5th of the month. I sent a single template on the 25th, with a deadline of the 1st and a reminder on the 30th. By the 2nd, 9 partners had replied. I called the other two: one sent its data the same day; for the other, I wrote "data not received" in the bulletin rather than reusing its figures from the previous month. While checking, I saw that one partner reported 4,200 people reached when its target population was 3,000: it had added up two activities for the same people. It corrected the figure to 2,650. The bulletin went out on the 4th. I then created an online form with automatic checks: the following month, 11 partners out of 11 replied on time.

Strong answer

In Haiti, I had ten days to deliver the interim report for a multi-sector project run by four teams. I sent a one-page template per sector, with the indicators pre-filled from the monitoring table and a deadline of day 5. On day 5, two contributions were missing and the water team's reported 34 rehabilitated tanks against 26 in the monitoring data. I called the team leader: 8 tanks were in progress, not finished. For the two late teams, I held a 30-minute interview with each and wrote their section myself, which they validated within a day. On day 7, I warned the coordinator that the financial section was at risk of being late; she obtained the figures the next day. The report went out on day 9, with no request for corrections from the donor. The template became the standard for subsequent reports.

Strong answer

During floods in Tanganyika, I had to prepare a two-page note in four hours for the humanitarian country team meeting. I had eleven sources, including three figures for displaced people ranging from 8,000 to 25,000. I classified each piece of information by source and date, called two team leaders to cross-check, then used the registered figure of 11,400 people, mentioning the higher estimates as unverified. I put three messages at the top: access cut off, a 60% water deficit and two areas with no actor at all. I ended with two decisions to be taken. The coordinator approved the deployment of a contingency stock of 1,500 kits and the assignment of a partner to the two uncovered areas the same day. My note became the template for subsequent reports.

Strong answer

As an accounting assistant in an NGO in Gitega, I processed around thirty advance liquidations a month. A team leader submitted a report of BIF 640,000 with a hotel invoice of BIF 180,000 whose date had been corrected by hand. I put the document on hold and calmly explained to him that the manual requires an original invoice without alterations. He protested, as he had to leave on mission the next day. I liquidated all the rest of the report the same day so as not to block him, informed my manager in writing and called the hotel, which sent a compliant duplicate within two days. I then proposed a one-page checklist, attached to each advance. In three months, incomplete reports fell from 12 to 4 a month.

Strong answer

On a food assistance project in Burkina Faso, my budget monitoring in month six showed the transport line 82% spent at 50% of the project duration, because of the rise in fuel prices. I first checked the coding: USD 4,200 of truck hire from another project had been charged to our line by mistake. After correction, the forecast overspend was still 14%, above the donor's 10% threshold. I gave the project manager a simple table: spent to date, forecast, and three costed options. He wanted to carry on without saying anything; I showed him the risk of USD 9,000 being disallowed at audit. We requested a reallocation of USD 7,500 from an underspent line, which was approved within three weeks. Since then, my monthly report automatically flags any line whose burn rate is more than 10 points ahead of schedule.

Strong answer

In Mali, during a monthly review of vouchers, I noticed that one base's fuel expenditure had risen by 45% in three months, while the number of missions was stable. I compared the logbooks, fuel vouchers and mileage records of four vehicles: about 1,900 litres had no corresponding mission, nearly 1.3 million FCFA. I said nothing on site; I sent a factual report to the anti-fraud focal point, who opened an investigation. It confirmed collusion between a logistician and a petrol station. During the investigation, I had named fuel cards and a weekly reconciliation of kilometres and litres put in place. Consumption returned to the expected level the following month, and this control was extended to the country's five bases.

Strong answer

I was a radio operator at a base that tracked up to eight vehicles a day. One afternoon, an experienced driver announced on the radio that he was carrying a partner's payroll and was taking the northern road. I politely interrupted him and asked him to switch to the phone, then informed the security focal point within five minutes. The focal point had the route and the return time changed. I recorded the incident in the log, without judgement, with the time and the content of the message. The next day, I proposed a two-page sheet on radio rules, displayed in each vehicle, and a 30-minute session with the 14 drivers. The driver thanked me afterwards. In the following three months, the log showed no further mention of funds or names on the radio.

Strong answer

In Bangassou, in the Central African Republic, one of our team vehicles missed its 14:00 check-in. At 14:15, I tried the radio, the satellite phone and the phones of the four passengers, with no answer. At 14:30, I informed the base manager and suspended other movements on the route. I called two organisations operating on the road: one reported a robbery at km 18. At 15:05, the driver called: vehicle stolen, team unharmed, walking towards a village. We organised their return with a vehicle from a partner organisation already in the area. I sent a flash report at 15:40, then the full report within 24 hours. The team received psychological support and two days of rest. Afterwards, we fitted the 6 vehicles with GPS trackers and required check-ins every 30 minutes on that route; since then, no missed check-in has gone more than 15 minutes without a response.

Strong answer

In Ouham, a distribution convoy was due to leave for an area where three armed robberies had taken place in two weeks, all on the same 10 km stretch. The programme wanted to keep the date, because 2,400 households were waiting. I scored the robbery risk at 16 out of 25 and recommended a 72-hour postponement. During that time, I obtained information from the NGO security forum and local leaders, then we changed the route and prepositioned the food in an assessed community warehouse, with a local partner. The distribution took place four days late, without incident. The donor, informed from day one with the options, accepted the new timetable. We then built prepositioning into the contingency plan of all bases.

Strong answer

During the registration of new arrivals, two of us had to enter 720 forms in three days. Before starting, I added drop-down lists to the file and checks on age, household size and duplicate IDs. We worked in numbered batches of 40 forms, with a break every two hours. At the end of each batch, the colleague re-checked 10% of the other's forms. On the first day, my error rate was 3%; I saw that most errors came from dates, and I changed the column format. It fell to 0.8%. The 26 illegible forms were set aside and checked with the registration team. We finished in two and a half days, with the forms locked away every evening.

Strong answer

In Niger, our monthly report for 9 projects was consolidated by hand from different files: it took 4 days and we found errors after it had been sent to the donor. I created a common data entry template with drop-down lists and locked totals, then a workbook that imported the files through Power Query, flagged duplicates and inconsistencies, and fed a pivot table and charts. To check it, I recalculated two past months by hand: I found 3 discrepancies, including double counting of 1,150 people in the old report, which I corrected with the MEAL manager. Names and phone numbers stayed in a separate file with restricted access. I trained 12 people and wrote a two-page user guide. Consolidation now takes half a day, and errors found after submission fell from 5 to 0 in six months.

Strong answer

In Niger, while preparing a transfer cycle for 4,200 households, I cross-checked the list against the previous cycle's list using a lookup on the ID and the phone number. I found 186 duplicate IDs and 74 phones shared by several households. The potential overpayment was about 9 million FCFA. I presented the results to the programme manager without concluding that there was fraud: field checks showed that 51 phones were genuinely shared between neighbours, and the other cases were double registrations. I built a workbook with data validation, a parameters sheet and an automatic duplicate check before each export, and I wrote a double-validation procedure. In the next cycle, the duplicate rate fell from 4.4% to 0.2%, and the file sent to the payment agent contained only the necessary fields.

Strong answer

As a hygiene promoter in a displacement site, I facilitated a session on handwashing in front of about sixty people. The women did not speak, and several left before the end. After the session, I asked two community mobilisers what had happened: the time clashed with meal preparation, and the women did not dare speak in front of the men. I proposed to my supervisor separate sessions of no more than 20 people, in the morning, facilitated with a female mobiliser, with a practical demonstration at the handwashing station. Women's participation rose from 15 to 48 over two weeks. During the household visits the following month, we found water and soap at the station in 62% of the shelters visited, against 35% at the start.

Strong answer

In Maroua, Cameroon, I was supervising the construction of 40 latrines in schools. During an unannounced visit, I measured slabs 5 cm thick instead of the 8 cm specified and counted reinforcement bars every 25 cm instead of 15. I photographed and measured 12 of the 18 slabs already cast: 9 were non-compliant. I drew up a written report signed by the site foreman, informed logistics and my manager, and suspended payment of the second instalment, as the contract allowed. The contractor offered me "an arrangement"; I refused and reported the attempt. He recast the 9 slabs at his own expense within two weeks. Afterwards, I introduced a step-by-step inspection checklist, signed before each concrete pour, and a technician visit at every pour. On the next 22 latrines, no major reservations were recorded at handover.

Strong answer

In a camp in Ouaddaï, we were supplying 16 L/p/d on average, but diarrhoea cases were not falling. Tests showed residual chlorine at the taps but E. coli contamination in 70% of household containers. With the hygiene team, I organised observations and six focus group discussions: jerrycans were never cleaned and families drew water with cups. We distributed 3,200 containers with lids and taps, organised jerrycan cleaning days with the block committees, and trained 40 community volunteers. I also raised the residual chlorine target at the taps to 0.5 mg/L. Three months later, container contamination had fallen to 18% and consultations for diarrhoea had dropped by 40%. Since then, I have included household-level testing in all my monitoring plans.

Strong answer

As a pharmacy assistant in a health centre, I was doing the monthly stock count when I saw that the amoxicillin stock card showed 4,000 tablets, whereas I counted 2,600. I first recounted with the nurse, then compared the issue vouchers with the consultation register. A voucher for 1,400 tablets for the outreach post had not been entered on the card: it was not a loss, but the planned order would have been too small and the centre would have risked a stock-out. I informed the head of the centre the same day and corrected the card with his signature. I then proposed that each issue to the outreach post be recorded at the time of departure and countersigned. In the next three stock counts, the discrepancy between the cards and the physical count remained below 1%.

Strong answer

In Chad, while supervising a health centre, I compared the consultation register with the stock card: 310 antimalarial treatments dispensed in one month for 190 positive RDTs. Reviewing 40 patient records with the head nurse, we saw that cases with a negative RDT were often treated, especially at night, when tests were not available at the duty station. Rather than sanctioning anyone, I ran a one-hour session with the 7 prescribers on how to manage a negative RDT, and we placed a stock of tests at the duty station. We agreed on a monthly register-to-stock reconciliation carried out by the pharmacy manager. Three months later, the gap had fallen from 120 to 9 treatments, and the centre had no further antimalarial stock-outs. The district health management team adopted the reconciliation sheet for four other centres.

Strong answer

In Kasaï, in W38, our surveillance showed 27 suspected measles cases in two health areas, with a case fatality rate of 9%. I had 6 samples sent, which came back positive within four days, and I proposed a two-part plan to the chief medical officer of the zone. For case management, we made care free, trained 34 health workers on vitamin A and complications, and screened all cases for malnutrition. For vaccination, we supported a response for children aged 6 months to 14 years, because 48% of cases were over 5. The zone chief wanted to vaccinate the main town first; I showed him the case map, and we started with the displacement site. The coverage survey found 93%, and case fatality fell to 2.1% within five weeks.

Strong answer

In South Sudan, I was managing monthly transfers to 3,000 households. My weekly monitoring of 4 markets showed a 35% rise in sorghum prices in six weeks, and stocks down to less than a week on an isolated market. I recalculated the minimum expenditure basket: the value paid now covered only 52% of it. I presented two costed options to the cash working group: an increase in value on well-supplied markets, and vouchers with 6 contracted traders, with transport support, on the isolated market. The donor approved a revision of 140,000 USD within ten days. We informed households through the committees and radio. Two months later, the share with an acceptable food consumption score had risen from 41% to 58%, and prices on the isolated market had stabilised. We then built revision thresholds into all our agreements.

Strong answer

In Chad, our 14 outpatient centres had a 64% cure rate and 27% defaulting, far from Sphere standards. I analysed three months of registers and conducted a SQUEAC-type coverage assessment: 58% of defaulters lived more than two hours' walk away, and two RUTF stock-outs had lengthened stays. With the health district, we opened 9 outreach sites run by mobile teams, trained 120 community volunteers in MUAC screening and tracing absentees, and set up a six-week stock alert threshold. I also organised a monthly death audit with the nurses. In six months, the cure rate rose to 79%, defaulting fell to 11%, and estimated coverage rose from 31% to 54%. The district adopted the outreach site model in its annual plan.

Strong answer

In the Central African Republic, a head of base asked me to recruit, without advertising, three guards proposed by a neighbourhood chief, citing the security of the base. There was a real acceptance issue. I proposed a five-day fast-track procedure: notice posted in three neighbourhoods and at the town hall, practical test and interview with a mixed panel including a community representative. The three proposed candidates were able to apply like the 41 others; only one was selected. I explained the decision to the neighbourhood chief together with the head of base, presenting the public criteria. The relationship remained good, and the proportion of recruitments carried out according to procedure rose from 70% to 100% over the year, which the donor audit noted. We then formalised the fast-track procedure in the HR manual.

Strong answer

In a displacement site in Burkina Faso, the gender parity index of our learning spaces was 0.58. I organised 10 separate focus group discussions with girls, mothers and teachers: distance, the lack of separate latrines and looking after younger siblings came up most often. We built 18 separate latrine cubicles with locks and lighting, opened a childcare space for under-6s next to each learning space, recruited 11 women as teachers or assistants, and organised journeys accompanied by volunteer mothers. A parents' committee, half of whose members were women, monitored attendance every month. In one year, girls' enrolment rose from 610 to 1,140, the parity index to 0.91, and the girls' dropout rate fell from 19% to 8%.

Strong answer

After floods in Pakistan, our transitional shelter model measured 18 m² for households of 7 people on average, i.e. 2.6 m² per person, below the Sphere standard of 3.5 m². I organised workshops with 40 families, half of them women, and 12 local masons. We adopted a 24 m² model on a 60 cm raised plinth, in local brick with a braced frame, with a partition for privacy. The cost rose from 610 to 690 USD; to stay within budget, we replaced some of the full shelters with 300 repair kits. Households without title were included on the basis of community attestations. A year later, 96% of the shelters were occupied, none had been damaged by the following flood, and 85% of families said they were satisfied.

Strong answer

In Kenya, during a drought, our plan provided for in-kind distributions to 6,000 pastoral households. My analysis showed that cereal markets remained supplied, but that the goat-to-maize terms of trade had fallen by 55% and that 25% of households were selling their breeding females. I proposed switching to cash transfers, funding commercial destocking while the animals still had value, and protecting the core breeding herd through feed and animal health. With the donor, we reallocated 900,000 USD. We bought 4,200 animals through traders, distributed the dried meat to the most vulnerable households, and monitored prices every week. After three months, the share of households with poor consumption fell from 36% to 19%, and sales of breeding females dropped sharply.

Strong answer

In a site of 14,000 people in Ituri, there were 74 people per functional latrine and 9 litres of water per person per day after an influx. I produced a gap analysis by block, presented at the site coordination meeting, with a map and a shared action plan. The water partner lacked funds: I referred the matter to the CCCM cluster and the water, sanitation and hygiene cluster, which mobilised a second partner for 60 latrines and water trucking. Block committees, elected with 50% women, chose the location of the latrines and monitored their condition every week. I also set up a single activity calendar to avoid duplication. In six weeks, we reached 41 people per latrine and 15 litres per person, and water-related complaints fell by 70%.

Strong answer

In a GBV programme in Cameroon, a local administrative official demanded the names of women received in our safe space after several assaults, to "launch an investigation". Sharing these names would have exposed the survivors to reprisals. I met this official together with the coordinator of the GBV sub-cluster. We refused any sharing of names, but offered aggregated data: 23 incidents over three months, concentrated around two water points in the evening. He agreed to patrols and lighting at these locations. Two survivors wished to file a complaint: we accompanied them to the legal clinic, with their informed consent. We then trained the team to respond to this type of request. In the following three months, incidents reported around these water points fell from 15 to 4, and attendance at the safe space continued to rise.

Strong answer

In eastern Chad, a family was located for an unaccompanied 11-year-old boy after four months of tracing. During verification, the child recognised his uncle, but expressed his fear of returning to a village where he had witnessed violence. I convened a best interests determination panel with UNHCR and a case worker. We verified the relationship through cross-questioning and two witnesses, assessed the safety of the village and heard the child three times. Decision: reunification with the uncle, who now lived in the camp, and no return to the village. We organised four preparatory visits, then follow-up at 2, 6 and 12 weeks, with school support and psychosocial support. A year later, the child was in school and the reunification was stable. This experience led us to systematically separate the question of place from that of family in our assessments.

Strong answer

In Iraq, we had 14 recorded hazardous areas around three return villages and two teams for six months. With the team, I built a prioritisation matrix: people exposed, essential services, evidence, feasibility. The additional non-technical survey made it possible to cancel 4 areas with no evidence, i.e. 310,000 m², and technical survey to reduce 3 other areas by 70%. We started with access to two boreholes and a school, then farmland. Priorities were validated by the national authority and in meetings with the villages, including women. For the remaining areas, we put up marking and ran 120 risk education sessions. After six months, 480,000 m² had been released, 62,000 of them cleared, 1,900 people had regained access to water, 210 households were farming again, and no accidents had been reported.

Strong answer

As shelter cluster coordinator in South Sudan, I found that only 9 out of 22 partners were submitting their 4W and that two counties were receiving duplicate kits. I first showed the duplicates, estimated at about 1,800 households, at a technical meeting, without naming any organisation. I then simplified the form from 34 to 12 fields with three volunteer partners, and introduced a monthly dashboard showing each partner the gaps in its areas, which also helped them with their own donor reports. For the two partners who resisted, I organised bilateral meetings and obtained the support of the co-lead from a respected NGO. In four months, reporting rose from 41% to 86% and reported duplicates almost disappeared. I escalated the two counties with no partner to the ICCG, which shaped the next pooled fund allocation. My lesson: I should have involved national NGOs from the outset.

Strong answer

In Mali, I published a dashboard of displacement sites used by eight organisations. Two weeks later, cross-checking against a new assessment, I saw that one site showed 26,000 people instead of 2,600: an extra zero in a data entry. The commune's population was overestimated by 38%. I withdrew the version the same day, published a corrected version with an erratum note, and called the two partners who had already planned distributions: one reduced its water order by 40 m³ per day. With my team, I added to the mobile form a check on the ratio of people per household, a list of communes linked to P-codes and a correction log. Over the following six months, errors detected after publication fell from 11 to 2. I also presented the incident at the information management working group meeting, so that others could learn from it.

Strong answer

In Burkina Faso, I took over a 900,000 EUR shelter project in month 6: 22% of shelters built for 40% of the budget spent. Earned value analysis gave a schedule index of 0.55; the main causes were a single supplier of iron sheets and two vacant posts. I launched a second tender, recruited a supervisor in three weeks and organised two construction teams. I wrote to the donor in month 7 with three costed scenarios; we obtained a two-month no-cost extension and the transfer of 60,000 EUR to accessible sites. Every Monday, I tracked completed shelters, spending and risks with the team. In the end, 96% of the shelters were built, with no overspend; the remaining 4% concerned an area that remained inaccessible, which we documented. The donor renewed funding the following year.

Strong answer

In Chad, drilling permits in refugee sites took four months on average, while we were spending about 200,000 USD a month on water trucking. With the water and sanitation sector, I calculated that six months of trucking cost as much as 14 boreholes. I wrote a two-page note for the ministry, then prepared the head of mission and the sector coordinator for a private meeting with the secretary general. We ruled out a public campaign that would have antagonised the ministry. In parallel, we presented the same figures to two donors. Three months later, a fast-track procedure brought the time down to about 30 days and a donor funded 10 boreholes over two years. I refused to use the photo of a child survivor of violence proposed by the team. Our contribution is real, but the change is collective: the whole sector carried the message.

Strong answer

In Ituri, a vehicle from our base was out of contact for 4 hours on an 80 km road, outside VHF coverage. It was stuck because of a collapsed bridge, in no danger, but the alert mobilised the whole security set-up. I analysed coverage: VHF reached only 20 km and the vehicle's satellite phone was flat. I proposed a repeater on a hill halfway along the route, coordinated the frequency with the inter-agency telecoms group, and had HF sets installed in the two long-distance vehicles, for 16,000 USD. I introduced calls every 30 minutes, a daily radio check and satellite phone charging on the departure checklist. I trained 26 drivers and staff members. Over the following year, no loss of contact of more than 30 minutes was recorded, and the repeater was shared with two other NGOs.

Strong answer

In Niger, an armed group was blocking our distributions in 11 villages, about 30,000 people, and was demanding to choose the beneficiaries and take a share of the food. I prepared the negotiation with management: written red lines (no payment, no levy, targeting under our control). Our island of agreement was the group's wish that "all villages be served", including those of herders. With the support of two religious leaders, I proposed elected targeting committees, including women, and publicly posted criteria; the commander received the criteria, never the lists. I twice refused the demand for a levy. We started with a pilot distribution in two villages, then extended to all 11 in six weeks. Over four months, 29,000 people were assisted and no diversion was found during post-distribution monitoring. The authorities were informed of the principle of the dialogue, without operational details.

Strong answer

In Madagascar, during a cyclone, only 31% of households in a coastal district had been warned in time and two shelters had stayed closed. I facilitated participatory mapping in 24 fokontany, which identified 640 people needing help to evacuate. With the meteorological service and the disaster risk management authority, we drafted a protocol with two triggers, at 72 and 48 hours, and pre-registered cash transfers for 3,800 households. Messages were translated into Malagasy and broadcast via community radio, SMS and town criers; each shelter had two keyholders. The following year, the protocol was triggered at 48 hours: 92% of households received the warning, 3,720 transfers were paid before the winds arrived and 610 of the 640 people identified were evacuated. The review showed that fishers were still poorly covered: we added a warning at landing sites.

Strong answer

In Haiti, three months after an earthquake, 74 people were waiting for a psychiatric consultation and the list was growing by 40 a month. Analysis of referrals showed that 42% were cases of moderate distress, therefore level 3 of the IASC pyramid. I introduced a triage grid and redirected these people to our 18 counsellors trained in a brief intervention. I secured mhGAP training for 9 general practitioners, with monthly supervision by the psychiatrist, for epilepsy and alcohol use. Anyone with suicidal ideation was seen within 48 hours. Six counsellors were exhausted: I organised weekly supervision, capped caseloads at 20 people and recruited five counsellors. In four months, the waiting list fell from 74 to 9 and the average time to access care from 38 to 12 days; no counsellor left the programme.

Strong answer

In Mozambique, a 38-year-old widow, mother of four, was threatened with eviction by her husband's family, who invoked custom to reclaim the house and two hectares. I checked that the land use right passed without distinction of sex, then gathered the evidence: the traditional chief's register, three witnesses, the children's birth certificates. We chose mediation with a respected leader whom we had trained in inheritance law, after a one-to-one conversation with her about her expectations and safety. The family's first proposal took the house away from her if she remarried: I refused to let our team validate it. The second agreement recognised her right to the house and 1.5 hectares, with the brother-in-law keeping 0.5 hectare in return for compensation. The agreement was registered with the local authorities. At the six-month follow-up, she was still living in her house, and the leader has since mediated 14 other widows' cases.